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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Using  a unique  ﬁrm-level  sample  of  approximately  700,000  ﬁrm-year  observations  of German  small  and
medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  this  study  seeks  to  identify  the effect  of bank  market  power  on  aggre-
gate growth  components.  We  test  for  a pre-crisis  sample  whether  bank  market  power spurs  or  hinders  the
reallocation  of  resources  across  informationally  opaque  ﬁrms.  Identiﬁcation  relies  on  the  dependence  on
external  ﬁnance  in  each  industry  and  the  regional  demarcation  of  regional  banking  markets  in  Germany.
The  results  show  that  bank  markups  spur  aggregate  SME  growth,  primarily  through  technical  change  and
the reallocation  of  resources.  Banks  seem  to need  sufﬁcient  markups  to  generate  the  necessary  private
information  to allocate  ﬁnancial  funds  efﬁciently.
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Does bank market power help or hinder the growth of infor-
mationally opaque ﬁrms? If they help, how do banks inﬂuence the
growth of such ﬁrms: by enabling them to grow more productive
or by aiding more productive ﬁrms in their efforts to grow? The
exact role of banks in ﬁrm growth has been largely ignored in prior
research, which is surprising, considering ﬁnancial intermediaries’
responsibilities for selecting productive projects and monitoring
borrowers. Both theoretical arguments and empirical outcomes
highlight that the effect of bank market power on ﬁrm growth
is ambiguous (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Zarutskie, 2006; Canales
and Nanda, 2012; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Berger et al., 2007).
Banks with market power may  hinder growth if they can extract
rents from existing lending relationships. The ability to lock in ﬁrms
may  also remove incentives for banks to ﬁnance more productive
new entrants (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Cetorelli and Strahan,
2006). Market power may  be particularly problematic for small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which tend to be information-
ally opaque and rely more on bank funding (Petersen and Rajan,
1995; Zarutskie, 2006). Yet if bank market power is too low, banks’
incentives to generate information about borrowers may dimin-
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ecause banks generate insufﬁcient information to identify the
ost productive ﬁrms (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). Similarly,
f intense competition prevents banks from extracting rents from
rms’ innovative investments, they may  not lend to such innova-
ors (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).
In response to these ambiguous predictions, we make an ini-
ial attempt to distinguish the effects of bank market power on
echnical change (ﬁrms growing more productive) and on resource
llocations (growth by more productive ﬁrms) (Beck et al., 2000;
arlin and Mayer, 2003; Kerr and Nanda, 2009). The lack of empir-
cal evidence about the importance of resource reallocation among
rms for aggregate growth (Basu and Fernald, 2002; Hsieh and
lenow, 2009; Basu et al., 2009; Syverson, 2011) appears largely
ue to the very high data demands, including comprehensive
rm-level information that is rarely available for non-listed cor-
orations, such as SMEs.
To overcome this challenge, we analyze the effect of bank
arket power using a novel data set of approximately 100,000
nformationally opaque SMEs in Germany between 1996 and
006, which we combine with supervisory data from all banks
n Germany. We  estimate the extent to which aggregate growth
s due to input growth, technical change, and resource reallo-
ation. To identify the relationship between bank market power
nd growth components, we exploit the regional demarcation
f banking markets in Germany, together with the difference in
he structural dependence of ﬁrms on external ﬁnance across
ndustries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Claessens and Laeven, 2005;
riedrich et al., 2013). In extending country-industry-level stud-
es, we apply this difference-in-difference approach to explain
ndustry-region-speciﬁc output components generated from ﬁrm-
evel data. That is, we use region-speciﬁc banking market power
ndicators obtained at the bank level and industry-speciﬁc depend-
nce on external ﬁnance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
In addition to distinguishing between the effects of bank market
ower on technical change and on resource reallocation, we use
ur ﬁrm- and bank-level data to investigate differences in effects
or more and less opaque SMEs and for different types of banks (i.e.,
ommercial, savings, and cooperative banks). Our within-country
etting eliminates concerns about controlling sufﬁciently for cross-
ountry differences of ﬁnancial systems and institutions (Claessens
nd Laeven, 2005).
We  ﬁnd that bank market power signiﬁcantly increases SME
rowth by stimulating both technical change and resource reallo-
ation. An increase of Lerner indices by 1 percentage point increases
ggregate SME  output growth by around 0.1%, at the median level
f industry dependence on external ﬁnance. The increase can be
ttributed approximately equally to faster technical change and
reater reallocation. We  ﬁnd several indications that growth effects
re largest for less opaque ﬁrms. For SMEs in industries that depend
ubstantially on external ﬁnance, we ﬁnd insigniﬁcant growth
ffects in response to increasing bank markups. Overall, banks
equire a minimum level of markups to generate useful private
nformation, which they can use for an efﬁcient selection and risk
onitoring, which ultimately leads to growth. Triple interaction
ffects across market power and the regional bank market struc-
ure further show that the positive growth effects of bank market
ower differ, conditional on the concentration of regional markets.
his ﬁnding corroborates prior studies, which show that market
tructure and market power correlate, but reﬂect different aspects
f competition. For our pre-crisis sample of German SMEs, the real-
ocation component of growth is signiﬁcant only in response to
ncreasing bank markups when markets are also highly concen-
rated. This result supports theories that emphasize the importance
f sufﬁciently large customer pools, together with stable bank mar-
ins as prerequisites for the generation of private information that
s crucial for efﬁcient lending choices.al Stability 19 (2015) 31–44
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Sections 2
and 3 present the data and method to estimate and decompose
output growth. We  discuss the main results in Section 4, conduct
robustness checks in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2. Sample and data
The data comprise a proprietary sample of corporate clients of
German savings banks. This data set has been used previously (Behr
et al., 2013; Gropp et al., 2014). It contains the ﬁnancial accounts
of all corporate ﬁrms that applied for a loan at a German savings
bank between 1996 and 2006. We  consider only ﬁrms with at least
three available balance sheets and exclude all ﬁrms with less than
two consecutive years of data, in which some production informa-
tion is missing, or for which labor expenses or material costs are
greater than sales. We  also leave out ﬁrms from the mining indus-
try, because of large outliers, and exclude two regions, namely two
urban centers that are geographically not adjacent and that host
most of Germany’s multinational enterprises. We  winsorize, at the
1st and 99th percentiles of all production function variables, to con-
trol for any remaining outliers. The sample is unique in providing
good coverage of very small ﬁrms for which ﬁnancial accounts typ-
ically are not available, though they account for a substantial share
of total output in the German economy. The average (median) ﬁrm
sales are slightly less than D 5 million (D 1 million). Thus, according
to the EU’s deﬁnition of SMEs, almost 65% of our sample consists of
micro ﬁrms (up to D 2 million sales), another 25% are small ﬁrms (up
to D 10 million sales), and a further 8% are medium-sized ﬁrms (up
to D 50 million sales). Only 2% of the ﬁrms in the sample are large.
In terms of industry, 25% of the ﬁrms are in manufacturing, 25%
are construction ﬁrms and 50% are in services, mostly business ser-
vices such as accountants or lawyers (see Table 1). The ﬁnal data set
comprises 696,119 observations between 1996 and 2006. In terms
of total output, the SMEs in our sample account for approximately
one-seventh of German gross domestic product.
The left panel in Table 1 depicts the mean and standard devi-
ation of the output, production factor, and intermediate factor
growth variables. The large dispersion in output and factor growth
across ﬁrms, even within each industry, illustrates the potential
importance of the reallocation of resources from unproductive
to productive ﬁrms. Mean growth rates further emphasize the
importance of cross-industry variation in terms of growth and
dependence on external ﬁnance (right side in Table 1). This sum-
mary of the ﬁrm-level data, stratiﬁed by industry, bodes well for
our approach of explaining cross-regional growth differences by
industry and regional banking market traits and the industry need
for external ﬁnancing.
3. Identiﬁcation and estimation method
3.1. Identiﬁcation
To identify the effect of regional differences in banking compe-
tition on SME  growth by industry, we follow the strategy suggested
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and subsequently pursued by, for
example, Claessens and Laeven (2005), Kroszner et al. (2007) and
Friedrich et al. (2013).
The ﬁrst identifying assumption is that dependence on external
ﬁnance differs across industries for structural reasons. We  measure
the equilibrium dependence on external ﬁnance (ED) using Com-
pustat data for U.S. ﬁrms, because we assume that they face the
lowest ﬁnancing constraints. Similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998),
we deﬁne ED to equal capital expenditures less cash ﬂow from
operations divided by capital expenditure. This measure gauges the
share of investment that is not ﬁnanced through retained earnings.
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics per industry.
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for ﬁrms’ (log) sales, capital, labor, and material expenditures per industry (ﬁrst panel). The sample comprises 696,119
observations (197,934 ﬁrms) for 11 years between 1996 and 2006. The second part shows output growth ( ln Y), growth of input factors ( ln X), technical change ( ln A),
and  the reallocation components ( ln R) on the industry level for the period 1996–2006. N and Firms denote each industry’s sample share of industry-year and ﬁrm-year
observations, respectively.
Production function components Mean/SD Industry growth components Mean/SD in % Share of:
ln Y ln L ln K ln M  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R ED N Firms
Agriculture 0.91 0.21 0.83 0.44 0.72 −0.02 0.58 0.16 −0.01 0.0398 0.0483
2.88  0.57 1.91 1.81 3.32 5.96 1.75 4.41 1.17
Food  products 7.48 1.38 1.66 4.21 1.67 1.47 0.53 −0.33 −0.42 0.0387 0.0342
17.57 2.86 4.30 11.27 4.41 4.61 2.09 2.79 0.53
Textiles, apparel &leather 9.78 2.22 1.48 5.55 0.10 −1.66 0.70 1.07 −0.94 0.0086 0.0080
17.06  3.65 3.50 10.26 9.37 11.03 4.59 6.60 1.17
Wood  products 4.21 0.95 0.86 2.40 3.08 0.22 1.53 1.32 −0.27 0.0175 0.0163
10.12  2.02 2.66 6.25 12.36 15.53 5.96 12.13 0.66
Paper,  printing &publishing 7.10 1.92 1.61 3.40 0.94 0.58 0.16 0.19 −0.73 0.0218 0.0206
15.62  3.64 4.39 8.70 3.79 4.11 1.89 2.93 0.56
Chemical products 14.22 3.06 2.83 7.38 0.73 0.39 0.40 −0.06 4.20 0.0052 0.0051
22.75  4.66 5.96 13.09 1.71 2.89 1.21 2.74 1.57
Rubber &plastics 8.90 2.29 1.88 4.57 3.07 2.49 0.78 −0.20 −0.11 0.0164 0.0147
14.98  3.42 4.15 8.66 5.78 5.39 2.36 3.08 0.44
Stone,  clay &glass 6.32 1.65 1.84 2.96 0.66 0.25 0.59 −0.18 −0.22 0.0145 0.0136
12.88  3.20 4.46 6.45 6.27 6.57 3.19 4.82 0.48
Metal  products 5.43 1.58 1.17 2.64 2.54 1.09 0.99 0.46 −0.21 0.0603 0.0556
12.19  2.99 3.21 7.07 5.52 4.29 2.84 3.34 0.64
Machinery 8.90 2.59 1.44 4.39 1.55 0.93 0.49 0.12 0.07 0.0307 0.0305
16.18 4.09 3.77 9.01 4.09 3.31 2.32 2.07 0.76
Electrical &electronic equipment 6.38 1.80 0.93 3.13 1.67 0.76 0.70 0.21 0.97 0.0318 0.0304
14.24  3.45 3.08 7.90 4.73 6.17 1.88 4.56 0.60
Transport equipment 13.14 3.11 2.85 7.53 0.66 0.51 0.28 −0.13 0.08 0.0066 0.0070
22.46  4.95 6.78 13.65 1.67 2.12 0.96 1.69 0.32
Miscellaneous manufacturing 6.07 1.51 1.14 3.11 1.53 −1.11 0.56 2.09 −0.41 0.0166 0.0160
12.97  2.93 3.06 7.61 9.71 9.57 5.36 7.61 0.84
Utilities 25.11 3.21 17.29 15.24 0.49 0.22 0.04 0.23 −0.14 0.0024 0.0033
29.41  4.54 14.75 18.62 2.65 2.64 1.63 1.40 0.20
Construction 2.29 0.73 0.31 1.15 0.46 0.23 0.52 −0.30 1.17 0.1952 0.1889
5.94  1.54 1.23 3.53 4.39 2.85 2.90 1.40 0.57
Motor  vehicle trade 6.46 0.70 0.73 5.00 7.14 5.69 1.91 −0.46 0.31 0.0889 0.0822
12.31 1.59 2.06 9.17 11.27 10.93 5.25 5.28 0.63
Wholesale trade 10.22 1.11 0.90 7.49 4.09 3.06 2.32 −1.29 0.37 0.0956 0.0928
18.69  2.33 2.77 13.26 7.30 7.36 3.34 4.01 1.16
Retail  trade 3.57 0.61 0.51 2.31 0.85 0.83 0.11 −0.10 0.10 0.1344 0.1367
11.42  2.12 2.69 7.30 2.63 4.32 1.48 3.84 0.46
Hotels  &restaurants 0.87 0.27 0.53 0.25 0.38 −1.02 0.12 1.28 0.03 0.0595 0.0601
3.11  0.83 1.53 1.43 2.09 2.97 1.03 2.54 0.24
Transport &storage 5.07 1.27 1.50 2.31 1.11 0.58 0.60 −0.07 0.05 0.0353 0.0361
11.04  2.51 4.35 6.77 2.12 2.81 1.61 2.10 0.21
Telecommunications 6.18 1.24 2.30 3.39 0.44 0.34 0.19 −0.09 0.13 0.0011 0.0015




















iBusiness services 5.05 1.10 4.07 2.42 
12.93  2.59 10.13 7.55 
ash ﬂows are the sum of the operational cash ﬂow plus increases
n inventories and payables, less decreases in receivables. Unlike
he United States, Germany’s ﬁnancial structure resembles a bank-
ather than a market-based system (Beck and Levine, 2002). There-
ore, the mean industry ED derived from Compustat ﬁrm-level data
ay  be a poor proxy for the equilibrium needs for external funding
n Germany. Thus, we also use debt-to-asset ratios based on data
rom the Amadeus database for ﬁrms in Germany, France, and the
nited Kingdom (Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2011).
We aggregate the ﬁrm-level data by region (r = 1, . . .,  67) and
ndustry (j = 1, . . .,  22) in each year (t = 1996, . . .,  2006). We then
egress industry output growth and its components (total input
rowth, factor reallocation, and technical change) Vrjt on depend-
nce on external ﬁnance (ED) in industry j and the average Lerner
ndices (LI), which is a measure for bank market power, for each
egion r in a difference-in-difference setting:rjt = ar + aj + at + b1EDjt + b2LIrt + b3(EDjt × LIrt) + rjt . (1)
e assume that dependence on external ﬁnance differs across
ndustries for structural reasons. If bank market power fosters.31 0.11 −0.17 −0.26 0.82 0.0791 0.0980
.63 2.97 2.11 1.59 0.98
growth, industries with greater ED should grow at different rates
than in regions with less competitive banking markets, after con-
trolling for industry-region and time-speciﬁc effects.
This identiﬁcation strategy exploits two particularities of our
sample of German SMEs and banks. First, it is a reasonable assump-
tion that the SMEs in our sample – all of which are customers of
regional savings banks and active in one of the 22 industries in the
EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009) – are active in
only one of the 67 regional markets deﬁned by the German Savings
and Loan Association. Second, the vast majority of German sav-
ings and cooperative banks do not serve customers outside their
region by self-imposed regulation; commercial banks also oper-
ate mostly in regionally conﬁned markets, except for the largest
four (German Council of Economic Experts, 2013). Therefore, it is a
reasonable assumption that market power in one region does not
determine market power in another region. Within regions, SMEs
also turn to different banks to demand ﬁnancial services. For a sim-
ilar time period, Popov and Rocholl (2014) report for a sample of
roughly 38,000 German SMEs that the average ﬁrm maintains rela-



















































cooperatives operated across regional borders.4
Panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows the mean Lerner indices across agglom-
eration regions in 1996 and 2006, that is the start and end of4 R. Inklaar et al. / Journal of F
ith four or more ﬁnancial institutions. Therefore, we consider dif-
erences in average market power between regional markets and
he (weighted) average growth of industries within these regional
arkets.1
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the variables speci-
ed in Eq. (1); in the remainder of this section we  explain how to
btain the data for aggregate growth Y, its three components, the
erner index LI as a measure of market power, and the Herﬁndahl
ndex HHI a measure of regional bank market structure.
.2. Output growth decomposition
Firms can grow by increasing their inputs or through techni-
al change. From the overall economy perspective, it also matters
hich ﬁrms grow. If more resources are allocated to ﬁrms with high
arginal products relative to marginal costs, aggregate output in
he economy expands (Basu et al., 2009). Therefore for ﬁrm i at
ime t, we measure output as sales Y, labor as L, capital as K, mate-
ials and other intermediate inputs as M,  and technology as A. Firm
echnology is represented by the output elasticity  ˇ of each input.
e specify for each industry j a Cobb-Douglas production func-
ion and use the Wooldridge (2009) GMM  variant of the Levinsohn
nd Petrin (2003) estimator to account for simultaneity of factor
emand and productivity at the ﬁrm-level.
n Yit|j = ˇ0j + ˇLj ln Lit|j + ˇKj ln Kit|j + ˇMj ln Mit|j + it|j
for each j = 1, ..., 22.  (2)
o aggregate ﬁrm-level dynamics to industry growth (compo-
ents), we estimate Eq. (2) for each of the 22 industries in Table 1.
olumns (1)–(3) describe the ﬁrm-level data to estimate Eq. (2) for
ach industry; column (7) shows the measure of each industry’s
ependence on external ﬁnance. Output elasticities are precisely
stimated and broadly comparable to the corresponding industry
ost shares from EU KLEMS. To conserve on space, we provide the
arameter estimates in an online appendix (Table OA 2).2
We  decompose output growth into the two “conventional” com-
onents and a reallocation component (Basu et al., 2009). Thus
e gauge the growth of aggregate output in excess of the cost-
eighted growth in inputs, which is relevant for welfare. Denoting
he cost share of each input by c, and omitting subscripts for indus-
ries j, we decompose ﬁrm output growth as follows:
 ln Yit = kckit ln Xkit
+ k[( ˆˇ kit − ckit) ln Xkit] +  ln Ait for k = L, K, M.
(3)
he ﬁrst term in Eq. (3) is the contribution of a change in inputs to
utput growth. The second term compares the marginal product ˆˇ
stimated in Eq. (2) to the observed marginal cost c of each input.
t is a measure of reallocation, because a shift of one unit of input
rom a low marginal product ﬁrm to a high marginal product ﬁrm
s beneﬁcial for the economy. The third term of Eq. (3) measures
he contribution of technical change to output growth.
The growth components in Eq. (3) are all deﬁned at the ﬁrm
evel; in contrast, in Eq. (1) we identiﬁed the impact of regional bank
arket power on industry growth by exploiting between-region
ifferences. To aggregate ﬁrm-level growth components to the
ndustry level, we used Domar weights vit , the two-period average
atio of nominal output over aggregate value added.3 We  decom-
ose industry output growth rates into the contributions of total
1 We describe the variation across regions in Section 3.3, together with robustness
hecks to account for nation-wide branching of the largest commercial banks.
2 Subsequent regression results are robust to different methods for estimating
utput elasticities.
3 We provide details on Domar weights in the online appendix.al Stability 19 (2015) 31–44
input growth, reallocation, and technical change for each region,
omitting the subscripts for regions r, as follows:
























 ln Ajt =
∑
i
vit ln Ait . (4c)
Our empirical analysis therefore uses  ln Yrjt,  ln Xrjt,  ln Rrjt and
 ln Arjt as dependent variables to estimate Eq. (1).
3.3. Banking market competition
The decomposition in Eqs. (4a)–(4c) is important so that we
can identify more granular channels through which banking mar-
ket competition and structure affect growth. Cetorelli and Strahan
(2006) show that less banking market contestability can facilitate
factor accumulation at large incumbents, thereby subduing the
pace of innovation (technical change), and of reallocation of pro-
duction factors from low-productivity to high-productivity ﬁrms.
Although both aspects have been neglected, we focus more on
theoretical models that emphasize the potential impact of ﬁnan-
cial market imperfections on the reallocation of production factors
across ﬁrms (Aghion et al., 2007; Herrera et al., 2011).
We follow previous studies by Hasan et al. (2009) and Koetter
et al. (2012) to estimate the Lerner indices (LI) for the population
of German banks. Higher LIs indicate more market power. Detailed
ﬁnancial accounts data come from prudential supervisory accounts
made available by Deutsche Bundesbank. The individual measures
of market power equal the difference between average revenues
and marginal cost, scaled by average revenues. We estimate bank-
speciﬁc market power metrics for all universal banks, including
regional and large commercial, savings, and cooperative banks,
using a latent banking technology estimation technique (Greene,
2005). The details about methodology and data are available in the
online appendix.
The identiﬁcation of the parameters b2 and b3 in Eq. (1), as a
means to explain output growth (component) differences, hinges
on an explanation of market power differences across regions.
Therefore, we allocate bank-speciﬁc Lerner indices to regional mar-
kets according to the location of the bank’s headquarters. This
approach is appropriate, considering that of the 3,368 universal
banks that existed in 1996, 607 were regional savings banks and
2,497 were local cooperatives, both of which are obliged to oper-
ate only within their region. Only the four large commercial banks,
thirteen central savings banks (“Landesbanken”), and four centralour sample period. Panel (b) shows regional Herﬁndahl indices,
4 We also used the weighting schemes suggested in the annual report of the
German Council of Economic Experts (2013), but these did not alter the results qual-
itatively. A range of alternative spatial allocation schemes of banks to regions, such
branch-location weighting, (inverse) distance-decay weighting, or adjacent county
weighting across various balance sheet positions, such as customer deposits, loans,
and  total assets are broadly consistent with rank-order correlations ranging from
75%  to 80%.
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Table  2
Growth components, dependence on external ﬁnance, and bank competition.
Notes:  This table shows the descriptive statistics for all variables used to estimate the baseline regression. The sample comprises information for 14,913 observations for
11  years, 22 industries, and 67 regions. lnY is aggregate growth; lnX is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term following Basu et al. (2009); lnA is technical change;
ED  represents industry-speciﬁc dependence on external ﬁnance calculated with Compustat data for matching U.S. industries over time; LI represents Lerner indices net of
operational inefﬁciency for each German region over time. HHI represents the Herﬁndahl index based on banks’ total assets for each German region over time.
Variable Abbreviation Mean SD
Output growth lnY 0.0160 0.0620
Input  growth lnX 0.0078 0.0672
Technical change lnA 0.0066 0.0306
Reallocation lnR 0.0016 0.0459
External dependence on ﬁnance ED 0.2185 1.2329
Lerner  index LI 0.1379 0.0840
Herﬁndahl index HHI 0.1846 0.1130
F shows

























tig. 1. Market power and concentration across German regions. Notes: This ﬁgure 
or  1996 and 2006. Darker colors in Panel (a) indicate higher levels of market powe
easuring the concentration of gross total bank assets.5 As these
aps clearly illustrate, market power varies substantially across
egions, as is necessary for identiﬁcation. In addition, both mar-
et power and market concentration increased substantially over
ime (see also Figure OA1 in the online appendix; German Council
f Economic Experts, 2013). Deciding on the best measure of
ompetition in the banking industry remains a topic of debate
Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009a), so we also specify a measure of
he regional banking market structure based on concentration. We
se the Herﬁndahl index of total bank assets. The use of loans or
eposits, instead of total assets, did not affect the results below.
. Results
.1. Baseline
We  estimate Eq. (1), using as dependent variables industry
utput growth ( ln Y) and growth components, namely input
rowth ( ln X), technical change ( ln A), and resource realloca-
ion ( ln R), to establish the effect of bank market power. Table 3
hows the baseline results for a sample of 14,913 region-industry
bservations from 1996 to 2006. We  report standard errors clus-
ered at the region-industry level. Clustering by region-year or
ndustry-year does not affect the results. The explanatory power for
utput growth in the ﬁrst column is an adjusted R2 of 15%, which
s rather high in a panel regression context. The R-squared value
or the technological change regression (10%) is reasonable. The
5 We include aggregate data for 96 agglomeration areas (“Raumordnungsregio-
en”) rather than the 67 regions deﬁned by the German Savings and Loan Association
hat we use in the regression analysis, for conﬁdentiality reasons. the distribution of LI and HHI  across German regions (“Raumordnungsregionen”)
more concentrated markets in Panel (b).
values are relatively low for the factor accumulation and realloca-
tion speciﬁcations.
The direct effects of both bank market power and dependence on
external ﬁnance are signiﬁcantly positive for output growth, tech-
nical change and reallocation. In line with Beck et al. (2000) and
Carlin and Mayer (2003) we  ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant effect on factor
accumulation as a source of output growth. The differential effect of
bank market power at different levels of external dependence is sig-
niﬁcantly negative for aggregate output growth, technical change,
and reallocation.
As Brambor et al. (2006) caution though, we need to evaluate the
(total) conditional marginal effect in interaction models to assess
the effect of market power on growth components. The derivative
of Eq. (1) with respect to growth (components) depends on the
level of dependence on external ﬁnance. Therefore, we  follow Law
and Singh (2014) and Lessmann (2014) and present the effect of
market power on growth (components) at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th,
and 95th percentile of the ED distribution in the bottom panel of
Table 3.
These conditional marginal effects are more informative than
the point estimates of the coefﬁcients. Even when the point esti-
mates of the coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant at the mean of the
variable, marginal effects at other points of the ED distribution may
be statistically signiﬁcant. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows
the total marginal effects of LI on  ln Y,  ln X,  ln A and  ln R
across the distribution of ED. Because we  base the ﬁgure on the
parameter estimates of Eq. (1) we  account for the heterogeneity of
external funding needs in each industry.For this sample of SMEs, bank market power spurs aggregate
industry growth signiﬁcantly. An increase of the average Lerner
indices by 1 percentage point increases output growth by 0.13% for
the least dependent sectors. An increase of market power by one
36 R. Inklaar et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 19 (2015) 31–44
Table  3
Aggregate growth components and Lerner indices.
Notes: This table shows the baseline regression results for 14,913 observations for 11 years, 22 industries, and 67 regions. Fixed effects identifying each region, industry, and
years  are included but not reported. lnY is aggregate growth; lnX is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term; lnA is technical change; ED represents industry-speciﬁc
dependence on external ﬁnance calculated with Compustat data for matching U.S. industries over time; LI represents Lerner indices net of operational inefﬁciency for each
German region over time. The bottom panel depicts marginal effects conditional on different levels of ED, ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Clustered standard
errors  by region-industry are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R
LI 0.1009*** 0.0103 0.0540*** 0.0365**
(0.0262) (0.0249) (0.0130) (0.0165)
ED  0.0066*** 0.0021 0.0011* 0.0035***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0010)
LI  × ED −0.0198*** −0.0042 −0.0067*** −0.0089***
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0022) (0.0034)
Constant −0.0164*** 0.0048 −0.0083*** −0.0128***
(0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Fixed  effects
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14913 14913 14913 14913
Adjusted R-squared 0.1580 0.0678 0.1034 0.0397
Marginal effect of LI conditional on ED percentiles
5th(ED) 0.1299*** 0.0165 0.0638*** 0.0496***
(0.0296) (0.0282) (0.0144) (0.0183)
25th(ED) 0.1082*** 0.0119 0.0565*** 0.0398***
(0.0269) (0.0255) (0.0133) (0.0168)
50th(ED) 0.0989*** 0.0099 0.0533*** 0.0356***
(0.0260) (0.0247) (0.0130) (0.0164)











(0.0244) tandard deviation, from 13.8% to 22.2%, would increase industry
rowth by 0.9%. In light of average output growth of 1.6%, these
ffects are economically signiﬁcant. The effect is smaller, though,
or industries that depend more heavily on external ﬁnance. Panel
ig. 2. Total marginal effects of LI conditional on ED. Notes: This ﬁgure shows marginal e
he  95% conﬁdence interval is indicated by the shaded area. The distribution of ED is plot241) (0.0127) (0.0161)
006 0.0387*** 0.0160
241) (0.0124) (0.0165)(a) of Fig. 2 illustrates that the total marginal effects of increasing
bank market power become insigniﬁcant for industries with very
high levels of dependence on external ﬁnance, though this setting
accounts for relatively few observations. Panels (b) and (c) in Fig. 2,
ffects of LI on  ln Y,  ln X,  ln A and  ln R conditional on the distribution of ED.
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s well as the corresponding total marginal effects in Table 3, show
hat factor accumulation does not signiﬁcantly respond to changes
n banking market competition across the entire ED distribution
hile technological change does so across almost the entire range
f ED.
The positive effect of bank market power on output growth
components) initially appears to contradict the ﬁndings of
etorelli and Gambera (2001) and Claessens and Laeven (2005) of a
egative relation between banking market concentration measures
nd industry growth across countries. To reconcile these results,
e note that industry growth in our study refers to the growth of
MEs, rather than all ﬁrms in an industry. In that sense, our ﬁnd-
ngs match those of Zarutskie (2006), who ﬁnds that increasing
anking market competition leads to stiffer ﬁnancing constraints
nd less investment for small, private U.S. ﬁrms (see also Carbó-
alverde et al., 2009b). Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) report that
oung ﬁrms, which tend to be small, actually beneﬁt from increas-
ng banking market concentration. Our results, based on (generally
ore opaque) SMEs, are thus not contradictory to earlier ﬁndings
ut they rather afﬁrm that different types of ﬁrms are affected
ifferently by bank market power.
Another important difference involves the reallocation compo-
ent, which other studies omit. The last column of Table 3 shows
hat technological change and reallocation contribute similarly to
ggregate output growth. At the median level of dependence on
xternal ﬁnance, an increase of market power by 1 percentage
oint increases technological change by 0.06%, and the realloca-
ion effect across SMEs amounts to a sizeable 0.04%. Therefore, it
ppears that one of the key intermediation functions fulﬁlled by
anks, namely to screen and identify the most promising SMEs, is
xecuted more effectively if banks can realize reasonable markups.
 positive effect of market power on the reallocation component of
ME  growth is in line with theoretical banking studies that show
ow the increasing contestability of banking markets leads to a
eterioration of loan quality, because banks generate less informa-
ion (Marquez, 2002; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Hauswald
nd Marquez, 2006). The last column in Table 3 and Panel (d) in
ig. 2, consistently show that growth due to reallocation becomes
nsigniﬁcant when dependence on external ﬁnance exceeds the
5th percentile of the ED distribution. This effect is in line with
tudies that show how banks reap monopoly rents after locking-in
redit-constrained customers (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Berger
t al., 2007; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2009b), such as those SMEs that
epend most heavily on bank ﬁnancing.
.2. Market power, market structure, or both?
We  measure bank market power in each region according to
he markups earned by all German banks to which SMEs can turn
or credit. In so doing, we assess the notion proposed by Boone
2008) that the (non-)competitive conduct of banks depends on the
ontestability of a market. Most prior studies instead consider the
oncentration of national or regional banking markets using mar-
et shares or Herﬁndahl indices (Bikker and Bos, 2008). Yet market
tructure and market power may  exert different effects on growth
nd growth components. Furthermore, Germany is among the least
oncentrated banking markets in Europe (Cetorelli and Gambera,
001; Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006;
arbó-Valverde et al., 2009a; Fernández de Guevara and Maudos,
010).
To test if the difference in competition measures drives our
esults, Table 4 provides the estimates when we specify the
erﬁndahl index on the basis of mean asset market shares per
egion.
Qualitatively, the total marginal effects of concentration in the
ottom panel of Table 4 are similar to the main ﬁndings we  obtainedal Stability 19 (2015) 31–44 37
with the regional averages of Lerner indices. Higher concentration,
conventionally interpreted as an indication of more market power,
spurs aggregate growth through technological change and reallo-
cation. The magnitude of these effects is somewhat lower than in
the baseline results, but overall these outcomes are in line with
Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Zarutskie (2006) who document
that the effect of bank market power on growth is positive. The
cost of powerful banks extracting rents from locked-in customers
thus seems outweighed in our SME  sample by the gains from the
generation of better private information about opaque borrowers
by banks. In line with Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), we ﬁnd that
the positive effect of bank market power on SME  growth declines
with increasing dependence on external ﬁnancing.
Although market structure and market power are correlated, the
differences in total marginal effects also indicate that they mea-
sure different concepts (Bikker and Bos, 2008). Furthermore, the
conditional marginal effect of monopoly power on external ﬁnan-
cial dependence also might vary according to the market structure
– a conjecture analogous to the changing relationship between
a bank’s market power and risk taking, modeled by Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010). For example, the beneﬁts of bank market
power for the growth of less dependent industries may  be ampli-
ﬁed in concentrated markets when average customer pools are
even larger, which enhances the quality of private information to
ﬁnancial intermediaries as in Hauswald and Marquez (2003, 2006).
Alternatively, powerful banks in regions with very few potential
contestants may  start to extract rents even from relatively less
dependent industries, as proposed in Rajan (1992).
To investigate the potential interaction between the regional
bank market structure and bank market power, we specify a triple
interaction term, in Eq. (5):
Vrjt =  ar +  aj +  at +  b1EDjt +  b2LIrt +  b3HHIrt +  b4(EDjt ×  LIrt)
+  b5(EDjt ×  HHIrt)  +  b6(LIrt ×  HHIrt)  +  b7(EDjt ×  LIrt ×  HHIrt)  +  rjt .
(5)
The according results are in Table 5. We  again draw inference on
the basis of the conditional marginal effects that reﬂect the total
effect of parameters b1 through b7 in Eq. (5) because of the changes
in HHI and LI at different levels of dependence on external ﬁnance.
The three panels in Table 5 show marginal effects, evaluated at
different levels of ED, ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile,
at three points in the market structure distribution, corresponding
to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the HHI distribution, as
mapped in Panel (b) of Fig. 1.
Aggregate output growth and technological change, across all
three levels of regional banking market concentration, exhibit the
previously documented positive effects. The contribution of fac-
tor accumulation to output growth remains insigniﬁcant across the
entire ED distribution in all three panels. The total marginal effects
of output growth and technological change decline somewhat as
HHI increases, yet the differences between the three market struc-
ture panels are not statistically signiﬁcant across ED.  That is, an
increase in banks’ markups continues to spur growth for every level
of external ﬁnancial dependence.
For the reallocation component, the important qualitative dif-
ference is that there is no signiﬁcant positive growth effect in the
least concentrated markets, i.e., the 10th percentile of the HHI  dis-
tribution. In banking markets at the median level of concentration,
reallocation increases growth only for ﬁrms in the least ﬁnancially
dependent industries and this effect is weakly signiﬁcant at best.
The bottom panel shows that an increase in the economic margins
of banks stimulates growth broadly when the regional market is
also among the most concentrated. The marginal effects for out-
put growth, technical change, and reallocation are all statistically
signiﬁcant and positive at the 1% level. Only ﬁrms in the most
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Table  4
Banking concentration.
Notes: This table shows the regression results for 14,913 observations for 11 years, 22 industries, and 67 regions. Fixed effects identifying each region, industry, and years are
included but not reported. lnY is aggregate growth; lnX is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term; lnA is technical change; ED represents industry-speciﬁc dependence
on  external ﬁnance calculated with Compustat data for matching U.S. industries over time; HHI represents the Herﬁndahl index based on banks’ total assets for each German
region  over time. The bottom panel depicts marginal effects conditional on different levels of ED, ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Clustered standard errors by
region-industry are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R
HHI 0.0329*** −0.0159 0.0231*** 0.0256***
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0054) (0.0065)
ED  0.0032*** 0.0014 −0.0003 0.0021***
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0007)
HHI  × ED −0.0028 −0.0010 0.0002 −0.0020
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Constant −0.0250*** 0.0117* −0.0155*** −0.0212***
(0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0029) (0.0035)
Fixed  effects
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14913 14913 14913 14913
Adjusted R-squared 0.1569 0.0679 0.1031 0.0398
Marginal effect of HHI conditional on ED percentiles
5th(ED) 0.0370*** −0.0144 0.0228*** 0.0286***
(0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0054) (0.0065)
25th(ED) 0.0339*** −0.0155 0.0230*** 0.0264***
(0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0054) (0.0065)
50th(ED) 0.0326*** −0.0160 0.0231*** 0.0254***
(0.0102) (0.0098) (0.0054) (0.0065)



































ependent industries exhibit no statistical reallocation component
ffect.
These results therefore suggest that the growth-enhancing
ffects of market power in banking are ampliﬁed in the most con-
entrated regional banking markets. This ﬁnding is consistent with
heoretical explanations by Hauswald and Marquez (2003, 2006)
hat emphasize the detrimental effects of small customer pools
or banks in unconcentrated markets, such that they dilute banks’
bilities to generate private information and in turn foster credit
isallocation (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004).
.3. Time-varying versus constant ED
Our identiﬁcation strategy differs from several previous studies
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Kroszner
t al., 2007; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Körner and Schnabel, 2011;
riedrich et al., 2013), in that we use a time-varying measure of
D. The EDs provide a sort of industry equilibrium in the depend-
nce on external ﬁnance and also can ﬁlter out time-, country-, and
ndustry-speciﬁc effects. To account for these rationales and show
hat our results do not hinge on the assumption of time-varying
Ds, we conduct two robustness checks.
First, we add additional ﬁxed effects that cover time-varying
ndustry effects and combined industry-region effects. These
ummies absorb all effects that vary between industries and over
ime and that those vary between industries and regions at the
ame time. Therefore, ED can no longer be included separately.
able 6 shows that the explanatory power of all four speciﬁcations
ncreases accordingly, with adjusted R2 ranging between 22% for
he factor accumulation and reallocation speciﬁcations and 29%
or the variance share of the aggregate output growth explained
y the regression.
Our previous baseline results are not signiﬁcantly affected by the
nclusion of additional ﬁxed effects. Thus, the limited explanatory
ower we reported previously appears to be of little concern. The111) (0.0063) (0.0065)
.0182 0.0236*** 0.0210***
120) (0.0054) (0.0072)
economic signiﬁcance is slightly higher, indicating that a 1 percent-
age point increase in LI leads to a 0.11% increase in output growth
for an industry characterized by a median ED level. Higher levels of
bank market power lead to higher output growth, once more driven
by technical change and a better allocation of resources among
SMEs within industries. The positive effect of bank’s market power
on reallocation is only present at higher levels of ED.
Second, to account for time-varying effects, we aggregate the
data across all years and provide the results in Table 7. In this spec-
iﬁcation, we  do not use any ﬁxed effects, which would exclude ED,
LI and the interaction term from the regression, because ED only
varies between industries, LI varies only between regions, and the
combined ﬁxed effects vary in the same dimension as the interac-
tion effect. However, we cluster the standard errors again along the
industry-region level. The results in Table 7 corroborate our main
ﬁndings: a higher level of bank’s market power spurs growth by
fostering technical change and factor allocation between industries.
4.4. Benchmark for equilibrium dependence on external ﬁnance
Our use of U.S. ﬁrms to determine the equilibrium level for
external dependence may  spark concerns associated with the dis-
tinct corporate capital structure of continental European ﬁrms (von
Fürstenberg and von Kalckreuth, 2006). In a traditionally bank-
rather than market-based ﬁnancial system, the role of external
funding sources likely differs (see Beck and Levine, 2002). There-
fore, we follow Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2011) and
specify additional ED benchmarks using UK ﬁrms, French ﬁrms, and
observed German ﬁrms’ external dependence indicators in Table 8.
All three benchmarks conﬁrm the main ﬁndings: larger regional
markups by German banks spur aggregate output growth. Except
for industries that depend most on external ﬁnance, this positive
effect of market power on growth appears to work through techno-
logical change and reallocation. Thus, it seems irrelevant whether
we rely on market- or bank-based systems to provide the bench-
mark for equilibrium dependence on external ﬁnance.
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Table  5
Aggregate growth components, Lerner indices and banking concentration.
Notes: This table shows the regression results for interactions of LI, ED and HHI for 14,913 observations for 11 years, 22 industries, and 67 regions. Fixed effects identifying
each  region, industry, and years are included but not reported. lnY is aggregate growth; lnX is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term; lnA is technical change;
ED  represents industry-speciﬁc dependence on external ﬁnance calculated with Compustat data for matching U.S. industries over time; LI represents Lerner indices net
of  operational inefﬁciency for each German region over time. The bottom panel depicts marginal effects conditional on different levels of ED, ranging from the 5th to the
95th  percentile and the 10th, the 50th, and the 90th percentile of HHI, respectively. Clustered standard errors by region-industry are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R
LI 0.0885*** 0.0318 0.0418*** 0.0150
(0.0292) (0.0283) (0.0139) (0.0169)
ED  0.0087*** 0.0047** 0.0015* 0.0025*
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0014)
LI  × ED −0.0300*** −0.0195** −0.0095** −0.0011
(0.0083) (0.0094) (0.0039) (0.0061)
LI  × ED × HHI 0.0534 0.0775** 0.0144 −0.0385
(0.0403) (0.0390) (0.0188) (0.0255)
HHI  0.0212* −0.0029 0.0138** 0.0103
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0057) (0.0070)
LI  × HHI 0.0490 −0.0907 0.0470 0.0926**
(0.0812) (0.0639) (0.0402) (0.0422)
ED  × HHI −0.0108 −0.0134* −0.0019 0.0046
(0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0035) (0.0044)
Constant −0.0251*** 0.0075 −0.0144*** −0.0182***
(0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0028) (0.0034)
Fixed  effects
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14913 14913 14913 14913
Adjusted R-squared 0.1583 0.0679 0.1041 0.0402
Marginal effect of LI conditional on ED percentiles and HHI
10th(HHI):
5th(ED) 0.1305*** 0.0460 0.0574*** 0.0270
(0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0149) (0.0194)
25th(ED) 0.1017*** 0.0306 0.0482*** 0.0229
(0.0282) (0.0277) (0.0134) (0.0169)
50th(ED) 0.0894*** 0.0240 0.0442*** 0.0211
(0.0269) (0.0263) (0.0130) (0.0162)
75th(ED) 0.0747*** 0.0162 0.0395*** 0.0190
(0.0257) (0.0251) (0.0126) (0.0157)
95th(ED) 0.0317 −0.0067 0.0257** 0.0128
(0.0249) (0.0253) (0.0127) (0.0169)
50th(HHI):
5th(ED) 0.1281*** 0.0297 0.0595*** 0.0390**
(0.0296) (0.0291) (0.0140) (0.0183)
25th(ED) 0.1040*** 0.0211 0.0515*** 0.0314*
(0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0130) (0.0167)
50th(ED) 0.0937*** 0.0174 0.0481*** 0.0282*
(0.0260) (0.0252) (0.0127) (0.0162)
75th(ED) 0.0814*** 0.0130 0.0440*** 0.0244
(0.0252) (0.0245) (0.0124) (0.0159)
95th(ED) 0.0454* 0.0002 0.0321*** 0.0131
(0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0123) (0.0164)
90th(HHI):
5th(ED) 0.1217*** −0.0153 0.0652*** 0.0718***
(0.0386) (0.0330) (0.0194) (0.0228)
25th(ED) 0.1104*** −0.0052 0.0607*** 0.0549***
(0.0327) (0.0285) (0.0165) (0.0201)
50th(ED) 0.1056*** −0.0009 0.0588*** 0.0477**
(0.0309) (0.0273) (0.0156) (0.0195)











. Further robustness checks
.1. Firm sizeThe effect of banking market competition on aggregate industry
rowth depends in general on the degree of information asymme-
ry that banks must resolve. Black and Strahan (2002) and Canales
nd Nanda (2012) show that smaller and younger ﬁrms, which265) (0.0148) (0.0191)
93 0.0497*** 0.0141
290) (0.0145) (0.0208)
are more opaque, face more stringent ﬁnancing constraints in less
competitive banking markets. Whereas our available data does
not include information about the age of the ﬁrms, an important
feature of this sample is that the vast majority of ﬁrms are very
small SMEs. More than half of them are micro ﬁrms, according
to the EU taxonomy with sales or total assets are less than D 2
million, and less than ten employees. Around 88% of them are
either micro or small enterprises with less than D 10 million in
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Table  6
Aggregate growth components and Lerner indices: interacted ﬁxed effects.
Notes: This table shows the regression results for 14,913 observations for 11 years, 22 industries, and 67 regions. Fixed effects identifying each region, industry, pair of region
and  industry, years, and year-industry pairs are included but not reported. lnY is aggregate growth; lnX is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term; lnA is technical
change; ED represents industry-speciﬁc dependence on external ﬁnance calculated with Compustat data for matching U.S. industries over time; LI represents Lerner indices
net  of operational inefﬁciency for each German region over time. The bottom panel depicts marginal effects conditional on different levels of ED,  ranging from the 5th to
the  95th percentile. Clustered standard errors by region-industry are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent variable  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R
LI 0.1151*** 0.0284 0.0623*** 0.0244
(0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0131) (0.0183)
LI  × ED −0.0221 −0.0192 −0.0126* 0.0098
(0.0148) (0.0179) (0.0070) (0.0106)
Constant −0.0073 −0.0305*** −0.0097*** 0.0329***
(0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0018) (0.0053)
Fixed  effects
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14913 14913 14913 14913
Adjusted R-squared 0.2894 0.2145 0.2321 0.2189
Marginal effect of LI conditional on ED percentiles
5th(ED) 0.1475*** 0.0565* 0.0808*** 0.0101
(0.0410) (0.0325) (0.0142) (0.0158)
25th(ED) 0.1232*** 0.0355 0.0669*** 0.0208
(0.0299) (0.0325) (0.0192) (0.0206)
50th(ED) 0.1129*** 0.0265 0.0610*** 0.0254
(0.0268) (0.0274) (0.0129) (0.0177)
75th(ED) 0.1006*** 0.0158 0.0539*** 0.0308*
(0.0252) (0.0344) (0.0124) (0.0158)
95th(ED) 0.0644* −0.0156 0.0332** 0.0468**
(0.0344) (0.0238) (0.0169) (0.0215)
Table 7
Aggregate growth components and Lerner indices: aggregated annual sample.
Notes: This table shows the regression results after aggregating the original sample (14,913 observations for 11 years, 22 industries, and 67 regions) to the industry-region
dimension. lnY is aggregate growth; lnX is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term; lnA is technical change; ED represents industry-speciﬁc dependence on external
ﬁnance calculated with Compustat data for matching U.S. industries over time; LI represents Lerner indices net of operational inefﬁciency for each German region over time.
The  bottom panel depicts marginal effects conditional on different levels of ED,  ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Clustered standard errors by region-industry are
in  parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R
LI 0.1151*** 0.0284 0.0623*** 0.0244
(0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0131) (0.0183)
LI  × ED −0.0221 −0.0192 −0.0126* 0.0098
(0.0148) (0.0179) (0.0070) (0.0106)
Constant −0.0073 −0.0305*** −0.0097*** 0.0329***
(0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0018) (0.0053)
Fixed  effects
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14913 14913 14913 14913
Adjusted R-squared 0.2894 0.2145 0.2321 0.2189
Marginal effect of LI conditional on ED percentiles
5th(ED) 0.1475*** 0.0565* 0.0808*** 0.0101
(0.0410) (0.0325) (0.0142) (0.0158)
25th(ED) 0.1232*** 0.0355 0.0669*** 0.0208
(0.0299) (0.0325) (0.0192) (0.0206)
50th(ED) 0.1129*** 0.0265 0.0610*** 0.0254
(0.0268) (0.0274) (0.0129) (0.0177)









(0.0344) ales or total assets and no more than 49 employees. Less than
% of the sample consists of large corporations with more than
49 employees and D 50 million (D 43 million) in sales (total
ssets).44) (0.0124) (0.0158)
156 0.0332** 0.0468**
38) (0.0169) (0.0215)Table OA4 in the online appendix shows estimation results of Eq.
(1), in which we aggregate ﬁrm-level data (for each industry-region
and year) separately for micro ﬁrms and non-micro ﬁrms. Not all


















Notes: This table shows the regression results for 14,913 observations for 11 years, 22 industries, and 67 regions. Fixed effects identifying each region, industry, and years are included but not reported. lnY is aggregate growth;
lnX  is input growth; lnR is a reallocation term; lnA is technical change; ED represents industry-speciﬁc dependence on external ﬁnance calculated with Amadeus data for matching U.K. industries (ﬁrst part), French industries
(second  part), and German industries (third part) over time; LI represents Lerner indices net of operational inefﬁciency for each German region over time. The bottom panel depicts marginal effects conditional on different levels
of  ED, ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Clustered standard errors by region-industry are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
ED for UK industries ED for French industries ED for German industries
Dependent variable  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R  ln Y  ln X  ln A  ln R
LI 0.3976*** 0.0825** 0.1988*** 0.1163*** 0.2214*** -0.0060 0.1097*** 0.1177*** −0.1139** −0.0107 −0.0646*** −0.0386
(0.0491)  (0.0413) (0.0228) (0.0269) (0.0353) (0.0328) (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0478) (0.0479) (0.0218) (0.0287)
ED(UK)  0.0526 0.2718*** −0.0542** −0.1649***
(0.0444) (0.0475) (0.0231) (0.0261)
LI  × ED(UK) −0.9049*** −0.2206*** −0.4387*** −0.2457***
(0.0989) (0.0849) (0.0433) (0.0561)
ED(FR) 0.0116 0.1049*** 0.0295* −0.1228***
(0.0319) (0.0393) (0.0172) (0.0305)
LI  × ED(FR) −0.5337*** 0.0638 −0.2437*** −0.3538***
(0.0792) (0.0794) (0.0385) (0.0513)
ED(GE)  −0.0431** −0.0588*** −0.0009 0.0166
(0.0176) (0.0194) (0.0080) (0.0104)
LI  × ED(GE) 0.4606*** 0.0413 0.2581*** 0.1611***
(0.1017) (0.1051) (0.0464) (0.0622)
Constant −0.0303* −0.0845*** 0.0112 0.0430*** −0.0123 −0.0306** −0.0147** 0.0329*** 0.0031 0.0259*** −0.0058 −0.0170***
(0.0156)  (0.0162) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0122) (0.0142) (0.0063) (0.0103) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0037) (0.0044)
Fixed  effects
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913 14913
Adjusted R-squared 0.1628 0.0690 0.1108 0.0418 0.1585 0.0679 0.1049 0.0407 0.1578 0.0685 0.1056 0.0399
Marginal effect of LI conditional on ED percentiles
5th(ED) 0.1705*** 0.0271 0.0887*** 0.0546*** 0.1285*** 0.0052 0.0673*** 0.0560*** 0.0084 0.0003 0.0040 0.0042
(0.0296)  (0.0268) (0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0272) (0.0255) (0.0135) (0.0169) (0.0285) (0.0273) (0.0136) (0.0174)
25th(ED) 0.1367*** 0.0189 0.0724*** 0.0455*** 0.1191*** 0.0063 0.0630*** 0.0498*** 0.0583*** 0.0047 0.0319*** 0.0216***
(0.0274)  (0.0255) (0.0135) (0.0168) (0.0266) (0.0251) (0.0133) (0.0166) (0.0251) (0.0237) (0.0124) (0.0157)
50th(ED) 0.1091*** 0.0122 0.0590*** 0.0380*** 0.1036*** 0.0081 0.0559*** 0.0395*** 0.1120*** 0.0096 0.0620*** 0.0404***
(0.0259)  (0.0246) (0.0129) (0.0163) (0.0258) (0.0246) (0.0129) (0.0163) (0.0266) (0.0255) (0.0133) (0.0169)
75th(ED) 0.0658*** 0.0016 0.0380*** 0.0262*** 0.0839*** 0.0105 0.0469*** 0.0265*** 0.1426*** 0.0123 0.0792*** 0.0511***
(0.0241)  (0.0238) (0.0121) (0.0159) (0.0251) (0.0242) (0.0126) (0.0160) (0.0296) (0.0290) (0.0147) (0.0189)
95th(ED) −0.0364 −0.0233 −0.0116 −0.0015 0.0017 0.0203 0.0094 −0.0280 0.1659*** 0.0144 0.0922*** 0.0593***
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f observations is less than in the baseline speciﬁcation in Table 3.
he coefﬁcients for micro ﬁrms do not conﬁrm the positive effects
f either LI and ED or the negative differential effect. The conditional
arginal effects of micro ﬁrm output growth in the left panel are
lso insigniﬁcant. Therfore, we ﬁnd little evidence to support the
onjecture that banks with market power lock in credit constrained
ustomers to extract rents (Rajan, 1992). Still, we also do not ﬁnd
ny evidence that larger markups in banking beneﬁt the smallest
rms in the economy.
The right panel of Table OA4 shows instead that larger, less
paque ﬁrms drive the positive growth effect from larger bank
arket power. The marginal effects for the decomposition are less
igniﬁcant due to the reduced variation when we aggregate over the
ubsamples of micro and non-micro ﬁrms. The result that techno-
ogical change requires some market power of banks is conﬁrmed
airly strongly, though. Sufﬁcient proﬁtability buffers in the bank-
ng industry thus appear necessary to ﬁnance riskier investments
hat lead to technological advances. Reallocation is only signiﬁcant
t the 10% level for the lowest dependence on external ﬁnance. It
s thus the reallocation of resources across micro and non-micro
rms, rather than the optimal allocation of resources within these
ize categories, that matters for aggregate industry growth.
.2. Soft information
We  also investigate the effect of market power conditional on
he amount of “soft” information provided by banks. An essential
dvantage attributed to banks in the SME  lending literature is their
bility to extract soft information from their credit relationships
Berger et al., 2001). For a subset of around 15,000 SMEs per year
etween 2002 and 2005 in our sample, we observe ﬁrms’ ratings as
etermined by the bank, and investigate if credit ofﬁcers add any
oft information that might change the overall ﬁrm rating from the
nancial rating, based solely on ﬁnancial accounts data provided
y credit applicants.
Table OA5 indicates no evidence of signiﬁcantly different growth
esponses to changes in bank market power for aggregate growth
components) across ﬁrms with and without soft information. Yet
his likely reﬂects the drastically smaller sample size for ﬁrms with
vailable rating information, rather than a providing strong evi-
ence contrary to the relevance of soft information in SME  lending.
.3. Firm risk
We  try to gauge more directly the riskiness of ﬁrms, which inter-
cts with the market power of banks (Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De
icolo, 2005; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010) and may  induce
nefﬁcient lending choices (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). To this
nd, we aggregate ﬁrm data across three groups of SMEs. Groups
re distinguished according to their Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968).
ltman’s Z-score is calculated on the basis of ﬁrms’ balance sheet
ata as the weighted sum of ﬁve ratios (with weights in parantethe-
es): working capital to total assets (1.2), retained earnings to total
ssets (1.4), earnings before interest and tax to total assets (3.3),
quity to liabilities (0.6), and sales to total assets (0.99).
Risky ﬁrms are those in the bottom quartile of the Z-score distri-
ution, whose Altman Z-scores are less than 1.69. Stable ﬁrms are
he 50% of ﬁrms that have Z-scores between 1.68 and 4.29; very
table ﬁrms are in the top quartile, with Z-scores above 4.3. After
ontrolling for the same ﬁxed effects we discussed previously, we
o not ﬁnd, in Table OA6, any signiﬁcant effect of market power
n growth (components) across different subsamples of industry-
egion growth (components), aggregated across companies from
he three different risk classes.al Stability 19 (2015) 31–44
5.4. Incorporation of ﬁrms
In addition to size and riskiness, information asymmetries differ
among SMEs, according to their form of incorporation. Private pro-
prietorships ex ante provide less ﬁnancial information to potential
lenders, because they are subject to lighter publication require-
ments. Ex post, they grant weaker titles to collateral, because
they have simpler procedures regulating personal insolvencies.
Public incorporation instead implies standardized and frequent
publication of ﬁnancial accounts, stricter legal procedures in case
of insolvencies, and minimum capital requirements. As private
forms of incorporation, we  consider sole proprietorship, pri-
vate partnerships (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts), and general
partnerships (Offene Handelsgesellschaft). Public incorporations
are limited partnerships (Kommanditgesellschaft, Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung), stock companies (Aktiengesellschaft), and
combinations thereof (KG. a.A., GmbH & Co KG).
The total marginal effects in Table OA7 for informationally more
opaque, privately incorporated SMEs show that an increase in bank
market power has a negative effect on aggregate growth for ﬁrms
that are active in the most dependent sectors of the economy. For
public ﬁrms the total marginal effects of LI on aggregate growth
 ln Y remain signiﬁcantly positive for most of the ED distribu-
tion. This positive aggregate growth effect is smaller in magnitude
than that for the entire sample, though. According to small busi-
ness lending literature, banks increasingly rely on standardized
rating technologies and thus require ﬁnancial accounts informa-
tion for SMEs too (Berger et al., 2007). Public ﬁrms are obliged by
law to generate and publish such ﬁnancial data; private ﬁrms are
not. The prime driver of aggregate growth among public ﬁrms in
Table OA7 remains technological change. Moreover, factor accumu-
lation becomes signiﬁcant if dependence on external ﬁnance is low.
Reallocation is insigniﬁcant, again corroborating our ﬁnding that
the ability of banks to facilitate reallocation across all SMEs, rather
than within the group of public SMEs, contributes signiﬁcantly to
growth.
5.5. Market power per banking pillar
We  already accounted for the considerable bank heterogene-
ity documented by Krahnen and Schmidt (2004), because we  used
a latent-class estimation technique to obtain the market power
measures, as we  describe in the online appendix. In addition,
we consider if market power per banking group exhibits differ-
ent effects on region-industry growth. Table OA8 shows the total
marginal effects across the ED distribution when specifying all three
regional Lerner indices per banking group and the associated inter-
action terms jointly.
The overall signiﬁcance of the total marginal effects deteriorates,
which indicates the high collinearity among Lerner indices for spe-
ciﬁc banking groups. The effects that remain statistically discernible
from zero, mostly among the group of commercial banks, provide
qualitative conﬁrmation of our main results. Larger markups spur
aggregate growth and technological change and, to a lesser extent,
the reallocation component of growth. As an exception, we note the
negative aggregate growth effects of increasing markups among
cooperatives (the smallest banks in Germany) on ﬁrms that are
most dependent on external ﬁnance. Thus, even the smallest banks
appear to command some local market power and extract rents,
consistent with anecdotal evidence reported by consumer protec-
tion agencies that these ﬁnancial intermediaries charge the highest
overdraft interest rates in Germany (Stiftung Warentest, 2013).A high correlation of the market power measures for each bank-
ing group within regions is consistent with the annual report of the
German Council of Economic Experts (2013), which suggest that the
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wned commercial banks, only the very largest maintain branch
etworks across the entire country. Accordingly, market shares
alculated across different regional deﬁnitions (states, counties,
unicipalities) and banking products (loans, deposits, total assets)
xhibit very high correlations of up to 80%. Likewise, regional Lerner
ndices weighted by banks’ local branches result in very similar
egional indicators of market power and do not alter the relation-
hip with regional growth substantially.
. Conclusion
We  exploit the regional banking market structure prevailing in
ermany to identify the effects of bank market power on the aggre-
ate industry output growth of SMEs. To this end, we combine
omprehensive SME  data with prudential regulatory bank data on
arket power. The novel SME  sample enables us to estimate three
ifferent growth components: input growth, technical change, and
 term that captures gains from the reallocation of production fac-
ors from unproductive to more productive SMEs.
During 1996 to 2006, bank market power enhanced output
rowth of SMEs at the industry level. A 1 percentage point increase
f average bank Lerner indices per region increases aggregate SME
utput growth by 0.1% at the median level of the industry depend-
nce on external ﬁnance. Aggregate output growth is primarily due
o technical change, but the reallocation of resources from low- to
igh-productivity SMEs is economically also signiﬁcant. Our results
uggest that banks require some markups to conduct their selection
unction in the face of credit risks, which constitutes an important
nﬂuence of banks on the real economy. This result is robust to
arious alternative measures of industry dependence on external
nance, in terms of both time periods and benchmark countries.
The positive effect of market power on growth and growth com-
onents is ampliﬁed in markets that are more concentrated. The
nteraction between market power and market structure shows
hat reallocation in particular contributes signiﬁcantly to aggre-
ate output growth only when banks earn margins and operate
n concentrated regional markets. This result therefore supports
heories that emphasize the importance of sufﬁcient margins and
ufﬁciently large market shares of banks to generate private infor-
ation necessary for efﬁcient credit allocation.
Finally, our robustness checks for subsamples of ﬁrms, dif-
erentiated according to various indicators of opacity and risk
ndicates the weaker signiﬁcance of bank market power effects on
rowth overall, such that the consideration of reallocation across all
rms, and banking groups, is important for determining signiﬁcant
rowth effects.
Overall, reasonable markups in banking were beneﬁcial for
egional growth prior to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009. They
ight be necessary to generate the important private informa-
ion required to support an efﬁcient selection and monitoring of
isks and, ultimately, growth. Even small banks can extract rents
rom locked-in ﬁrms that depend heavily on external ﬁnance,
hich hampers their growth. Therefore, regional market conditions
hould be integrated into antitrust policies, rather than relying
olely on considerations of bank size.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2015.05.004eferences
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